Articles
Causation
Henne, P. & O'Neill, K. (2022). Double Prevention, Causal Judgments, and Counterfactuals. Cognitive Science. PREPRINT PDF
O'Neill, K., Henne, P., Bello, P., Pearson, J., & De Brigard, F. (2022). Confidence and Gradation in Causal Judgment. Cognition. PREPRINT PDF
Henne, P. Experimental Metaphysics: Causation. (Forthcoming). The Compact Compendium of Experimental Philosophy. PREPRINT
Niemi, L. & Henne, P. (2022). Victim omissions: How doing nothing affects judgments of cause and blame. Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Responsibility. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. Book
O'Neill, K., Henne, P., Pearson, J., & De Brigard, F. (2021). Measuring and Modeling Confidence in Human Causal Judgment. PREPRINT
Henne, P., Kulesza, A., Perez, K., & Houcek, A. (2021). Counterfactual Thinking and Recency Effects in Causal Judgment. Cognition. PREPRINT PDF
Henne, P., O'Neill, K., Bello, P., Khemlani, S., & De Brigard, F. (2021). Norms Affect Prospective Causal Judgments. Cognitive Science. PREPRINT PDF
Henne, P., Niemi, L., Pinillos, Á., De Brigard, F., & Knobe, J. (2019). A Counterfactual Explanation for the Action Effect. Cognition, 190, 157-164. PREPRINT PDF
Henne, P., Bello, P., Khemlani, S., & De Brigard, F. (2019). Norms and the meaning of omissive enabling conditions. In A. Goel, C. Seifert, & C. Freksa (Eds.), Proceedings of the 41st Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Montreal, Canada: Cognitive Science Society. PREPRINT PDF
Henne, P., Pinillos, Á., & De Brigard, F. (2017). Cause by omission and norm: Not watering plants. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 95(2), 270-283. PDF
Counterfactual Thinking
De Brigard, F., Henne, P., & Stanley, M. L. (2021). Perceived similarity of imagined possible worlds affects judgments of counterfactual plausibility. Cognition. PDF
Intentional Action
Pavese, C. & Henne, P. (2023). The Know-How Solution to Kraemer’s Puzzle. Cognition. PREPRINT PDF
Pavese, C., Henne, P., Beddor, B. (2023). Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action. Ergo. PREPRINT PDF
'Ought' Implies 'Can'
Semler, J. & Henne, P. (2019). Recent Experimental Work on ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’. Philosophy Compass, 14(9), e12619. PREPRINT PDF
Henne, P., Semler, J., Chituc, V., De Brigard, F., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2018). Against Some Recent Arguments for ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’: Reasons, Deliberation, Trying, and Furniture. Philosophia, 47(1), 131-139. PDF
Henne, P., Chituc, V., De Brigard, F., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2016). An Empirical Refutation of ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’. Analysis, 76(3), 283-290. PDF
Chituc, V., Henne, P., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., & De Brigard, F. (2016). Blame, not ability, impacts moral “ought” judgments for impossible actions: Toward an empirical refutation of “ought” implies “can”. Cognition, 150, 20-25. PDF
Moral Memories
Stanley, M. L., Henne, P., Niemi, L., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., & De Brigard, F. (2021). Making moral principles suit yourself. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. PDF
Stanley, M. L., Henne, P., & De Brigard, F. (2018). Remembering Moral and Immoral Actions in Constructing the Self. Memory and Cognition, 47(3), 441-454. PDF
Stanley, M. L., Henne, P., Iyengar, V., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., & De Brigard, F. (2017). I’m not the person I used to be: The self and autobiographical memories of immoral actions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 146(6), 884-895. PDF
Moral and Political Reasoning
Stanley, M. L., Henne, P., Yang, B. W., & De Brigard, F. (2020). Resistance to Position Change, Motivated Reasoning, and Polarization. Political Behavior, 42, 891-913. PDF
Stanley, M. L., Dougherty, A. M., Yang, B. W., Henne, P., & De Brigard, F. (2018). Reasons Probably Won't Change Your Mind: The Role of Reasons in Revising Moral Decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 147(7), 962-987. PDF
Metaphilosophy
Henne, P., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2018). Does Neuroscience Undermine Morality? In Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience. OUP. Book
Replications
Chandrashekar, P., Adelina, N., Zeng, S., Chiu, Y., Leung, Y., Henne, P., Cheng, B., Feldman, G. (2023). Defaults versus framing: Revisiting Default Effect and Framing Effect with replications and extensions of Johnson and Goldstein (2003) and Johnson, Bellman, and Lohse (2002). Meta Psychology, 7. PREPRINT PDF